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Andreas Hüttemann
PHYSICALISM AND THE PART-WHOLE RELATION
Abstract: In this paper I intend to analyse whether a certain kind of physicalism 
(Part-whole-physicalism) is supported by what classical mechanics and quantum mechanics 
have to say about the part whole relation . I will argue that not even the most likely candi-
dates – namely cases of micro-explanation of the dynamics of compound systems – provide 
evidence for part whole-physicalism, i .e . the thesis that the behavior of the compound obtains 
in virtue of the behavior of the parts . Physics does not dictate part-whole-physicalism .
In this paper I intend to analyse whether a certain kind of physicalism 
(Part-whole-physicalism) is supported by what classical mechanics and 
quantum mechanics have to say about the part whole relation .
1. Physicalism
I will first characterize what I take to be the core physicalist intuition . Next 
I will disambiguate two physicalist claims and will then make one of the 
physicalist claims as precise as is necessary for the purposes of this paper .
Different authors use different vocabulary when they characterize what 
they take to be the core physicalist intuition . Jaegwon Kim, for instance, 
describes his own view (which he calls “physicalism” elsewhere) as fol-
lows:
The broad metaphysical conviction that underlies these proposals is the belief that 
ultimately the world – at least, the physical world – is the way it is because the mi-
cro-world is the way it is [ . . .] . (Kim 1984a, p . 100)
(The qualification in the parentheses has to be dropped for physicalism 
proper .) Kim uses ‘because’ to express that the macro-world depends on 
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the micro-world . A central tenet in the debate about physicalism is to say 
something informative about this dependence relation . Philip Pettit in-
vokes political metaphors for this purpose:
The fundamentalism that the physicalist defends gives total hegemony, as we might 
say, to the microphysical order: it introduces the dictatorship of the proletariat . (Pettit 
1993, pp . 220–221)
And elsewhere:
[M]icrophysicalism [ . . .] is the doctrine that actually (but not necessarily) everything 
non-microphysical is composed out of microphysical entities and is governed by 
microphysical laws . (Pettit 1994, p . 253)
What is important in this context is that these metaphors characterise the 
dependence in question as asymmetrical . This will be essential for my lat-
er argument . Another expression that is sometimes used to characterize 
the asymmetric dependence relation is “in virtue of .” Barry Loewer, for 
instance, writes:
Physicalism claims that all facts obtain in virtue of the distribution of the fundamen-
tal entities and properties – whatever they turn out to be – of completed fundamental 
physics . (Loewer 2001, p . 37)
I will use Loewer’s formulation as my starting point for an explication of 
physicalism .1
Before I approach the issue of clarifying the in virtue-claim I will dis-
ambiguate two different kinds of physicalism – levels-physicalism and 
part-whole-physicalism . The different issues at stake can be illustrated by 
an example .2 Consider a case in which the state of a whole (the ferro-
magnetic state of a piece of iron) is explained in terms of the states of 
the parts (magnetic dipoles of the iron-atoms) . Two questions/issues can 
be distinguished . First, we can ask whether the ferromagnetic state of the 
piece of iron corresponds to some microstate of the piece of iron for in-
stance a state that can be described as a so-called spin-wave state of the 
piece of iron . This issue concerns the relation of two kinds of states of the 
same system – the ferromagnetic state and the spin-wave-state of the piece 
of iron . A second question is whether the spin-wave state of the piece of 
1 There are various problems I will bypass . One of these has been called Hempel’s dilemma . 
Physicalism can either be defined via reference to contemporary physics, but then it is most 
probably false, or it can be defined via reference to a future or ideal physics, but then it is triv-
ial in the sense of not falsifiable, because we are unable to predict what a future physics will 
contain (see Hempel 1969; Crane and Mellor 1990; Melnyk 2003, pp . 11–20; Stoljar 2009) .
2 For a more detailed analysis of the difference between levels-physicalism and part-whole-phy-
icalism see (Hüttemann and Papineau 2005) .
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iron can be explained in terms of the states of the individual atoms and 
certain relations and interactions among them . This question concerns the 
relation between the state of the whole piece of iron on the one hand and 
the states of its components on the other hand: how do the individual states 
of the atoms add up to the spin-wave-state of the whole? The latter issue 
concerns the relation between parts and wholes, not between two states of 
the same system .
More generally, one issue concerns levels . How do entities picked out 
by non-fundamental terminology, such as biological or psychological ter-
minology (or “magnetization”), relate to fundamental physical entities? A 
physicalist with respect to levels claims:
Levels physicalism: Putatively non-physical properties obtain in virtue 
of (fundamental) physical properties .
A second issue concerns parts and wholes . A physicalist with respect to 
the part-whole-relation claims:
Part-whole-physicalism: The properties of compound systems are the 
way they are in virtue of the properties of their parts (and some further 
facts about how the parts interact and how they are related) .3
In this paper I will be concerned with the question whether 
part-whole-physicalism is supported by what classical mechanics or quan-
tum mechanics have to say about the part-whole relation .
2. Physicalism, Supervenience and Duplicates
Loewer’s characterization of physicalism as well as my own characteri-
zations of levels-physicalism and part-whole-physicalism contain the ex-
pression “in virtue .” Very often the in virtue-claim is spelled out in terms 
of supervenience and related concepts such as duplicates . I will not go into 
the details of this discussion but only briefly indicate why this approach is 
not satisfactory .
Loewer discusses Frank Jackson’s explication of physicalism . Accord-
ing to Jackson physicalists hold:
(P) Physicalism is true iff every world that is a minimal physical dupli-
cate of the actual world is a duplicate simpliciter .4
3 The term “physicalism” in this context is only appropriate if it is assumed that there are 
fundamental parts, which can be characterized as physical parts . This is clearly a contentious 
issue but nothing in what follows will depend on this choice of terminology .
4 The formulation is due to Barry Loewer (Loewer 2001, p . 39) . Frank Jackson defends his 
position in (Jackson 1998, Chapter 1) .
Andreas Hüttemann - 9789004310827
Heruntergeladen von Brill.com05/19/2021 01:42:25PM
via Stadt- und Universitatsbibl. Koln
326 Andreas Hüttemann 
Principle (P) is meant to capture the idea that once the physical facts of 
our world are fixed all the facts of our world are fixed . If (P) is true all 
non-physical facts globally supervene on the physical facts .
As Jackson acknowledges, definitions of physicalism have to capture 
asymmetry claims that are associated with it:
Physicalism is associated with various asymmetry doctrines, most famously with the 
idea that the psychological depends in some sense on the physical, and not the other 
way round . (Jackson 1998, p . 14)
However, as Loewer points out Jackson’s principle (P) fails to capture the 
asymmetry or in virtue-claim (Loewer and Jackson discuss what I have 
called “levels-physicalism”):
The worry is that (P) may not exclude the possibility that mental and physical prop-
erties are distinct but necessarily connected in a way that neither is more basic than 
the other . In this case it doesn’t seem correct to say that one kind of property obtains 
in virtue of the other’s obtaining . (Loewer 2001, p . 39)
Claims about supervenience and duplicates do not entail that properties of 
one kind obtain in virtue of properties of another kind . Loewer acknowl-
edges this problem without providing a solution:
if considerations about the nature of necessity do not rule this possibility out then we 
must admit that (P) is not quite sufficient for physicalism . However, it seems to me 
that if we had good reasons to believe (P), then, unless we also had some reason to 
believe that despite (P) mental facts (or some other kind of facts) do not hold in virtue 
of physical facts, we have good reason to accept physicalism . (Loewer 2001, p . 39)
In the remainder of this paper I will argue that classical and quantum 
mechanics fail to provide good reasons for the claim that in the case of 
part-whole-physicalism the in virtue-claim does hold . Physics does not 
dictate part-whole-physicalism . This argument, however, presupposes that 
something more is said about the in virtue relation .
3. The In Virtue-Relation
Recently various authors have attempted to explicate such expressions as 
“fact F obtains in virtue of fact G” or “fact F is grounded in fact G” (Rosen 
2010; Audi 2012) . The terminology developed in this context allows me 
to define part-whole-physicalism as precise as is necessary for arguing 
against it .
What needs to be analysed are sentences like “The fact that p obtains in 
virtue of (is grounded in) the fact that q” where ‘p’ and ‘q’ stand for prop-
ositions . Following Rosen, I will introduce some notation:
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 [p]: the fact that p
 [p] ← [q]: “[p] is grounded in [q]”
 [p] ← Γ: “The fact that p is grounded in the collection of facts Γ.”
 [p] ↞ [q] =def for some Γ: [p] ← Γ, [q]: “[p] obtains partially in vir-
tue of (is partially grounded in) [q]”
We can now reformulate the doctrine of part-whole-physicalism in terms 
of this terminology . The claim
The fact that a compound has certain properties obtains in virtue of (is grounded in) 
the facts that the parts have certain properties and some further facts about how the 
parts interact and how they are related .
can be reformulated in terms of the following abbreviations:
 [w]: the fact that the compound/whole has certain properties,
 [p1]: the fact that part p1 has a certain property, etc,
 Δ: further facts about how the parts interact and how they are relat-
ed .
Part-whole-physicalism can now be written as the claim that for all wholes 
w there are parts p1… pn and further facts Δ such that
 [w] ← [p1], [p2],  . . . [pn], Δ
Furthermore, we can reformulate claims like the following: “The fact that 
a whole has certain properties partially obtains in virtue of (is partially 
grounded in) the fact that part [p1] has certain properties .” and similar 
claims for [p2] etc .:
 [w] ↞ [p1]
 [w] ↞ [p2]
 etc .
Rosen’s approach in developing a theory of the in virtue- or grounding-re-
lation is to distil certain principles, which we hold to be true in all those 
cases where we seem to understand in virtue-talk . The first such principle 
is asymmetry (and that is all I will need):
 asymmetry: if [p] ↞ [q] then: not [q] ↞ [p]
To give an example: When we claim that semantic facts obtain in virtue 
of non-semantic facts we (implicitly) deny that non-semantic facts obtain 
in virtue of semantic facts . (As a matter of fact the asymmetry principle is 
controversial among grounding-theorists (see for instances Wilson forth-
coming) . However, since I intend to explicate the in virtue-expression as it 
is used in the limited debate about part-whole-physicalism, where – as we 
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have seen – it is used as expressing some kind of asymmetry, there is no 
problem accepting this principle for the purpose of this paper .)
We have seen in sections 1 and 2 that part-whole-physicalism is asso-
ciated with asymmetry-claims . Rosen’s terminology provides us with the 
means to make this claim sufficiently precise so as to work with it .
4. Micro-Explanation
Part-whole-physicalism claims that the properties of compound systems 
are the way they are in virtue of the properties of their parts (and some 
further facts about how the parts interact and how they are related) . There 
is an asymmetrical dependence of the behavior of the compound on that of 
the parts . Physics seems to provide ample evidence for this claim . Robert 
Klee, for instance, argues:
Micro-explanation is powerful in virtue of the fact that when a level of organization 
within a system can be explained in terms of lower-levels of organization this must be 
because the lower-levels (i .e . the micro-properties) determine the higher-levels (i .e . 
the macro-properties) . This is why micro-explanation makes sense – the direction 
of explanation recapitulates the direction of determination . (Klee 1984, pp . 59–60)
So, the argument runs like this: The fact that we can explain the behavior of 
compound systems (wholes) in terms of the behavior of its parts supports 
the claim that there is a direction of determination from the micro-level to 
the macro-level . The fact that determination is directed warrants the claim 
that what happens at the macro-level happens in virtue of what happens at 
the micro-level .
In what follows I will take a closer look at this kind of argument from 
physics to physicalism .
Explaining the behavior of compound systems in terms of their parts 
may mean more than one thing . So what does ‘behavior’ mean in this con-
text? With respect to the behavior of a physical system, we can distinguish 
the state of the system, its constants, and its temporal evolution . Some 
quantities of a physical system are constant; others vary with time . In the 
case of classical particles, we can, for instance, distinguish their positions 
and momenta as changing quantities, while other quantities (that might be 
relevant for the system under consideration) such as the gravitational con-
stant remain constant . The values of the variable quantities at a particular 
time are called the state of the physical system at this time . However, the 
constants and the state of a system at a particular time do not exhaust what 
is commonly understood as the system’s behavior . Furthermore, we have 
laws that describe the connections between the various quantities involved, 
and in particular, they describe how the state of the system develops in 
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time . What these laws describe is the temporal evolution or dynamics of 
the system . Explaining the behavior of compound systems in terms of their 
parts may either refer to the state or to the dynamics .
Micro-explanation of the state of a compound system explains the state 
at a certain time in terms of the states of the parts at the same time . Thus, 
we might explain why a compound system, such as an ideal gas, has the 
determinate energy value E* (the macro-state) by pointing out that the 
constituents have the determinate energy values E1 to En (the states of the 
parts) .
Quantum entanglement is a prominent counterexample to this kind of 
micro-explanation . It is not, in general, possible to explain the state of 
compound quantum mechanical systems in terms of the states of the parts 
because quantum mechanics does not, in general, specify such states for 
the parts (see e .g . Maudlin 1998) .
This is bad news for the part-whole-physicalist (assuming that the ev-
idence for part-whole-physicalism consists in successful micro-explana-
tions), but not as bad as it might seem . There is another dimension to 
micro-explanation – micro-explanation of the dynamic of the compound 
system – that is not confronted with counterexamples from quantum me-
chanics (see Hüttemann 2005 for this distinction) .
Micro-explanation of the dynamics of a compound specifies the tempo-
ral evolution or dynamics of the system in terms the dynamics of the parts 
(Plus interactions among the parts) . This is why it is appropriately consid-
ered as a form of micro-explanation: the behavior of the compound (the 
dynamics of the system) is explained in terms of the behavior (dynamics) 
of the parts .
In what follows I will focus exclusively on the micro-explanation of the 
dynamics of a system, because it is the only option for the part-whole-phys-
icalist .
So, how does this kind of micro-explanation work? By way of illustra-
tion, a simple example is a non-interacting two-particle system . The first 
step in the explanation or analysis of the dynamics of this system is the 
identification of its parts, i .e . the two (isolated) one-particle systems .
The second step consists in the determination of the dynamics of the 
isolated one-particle system . According to classical mechanics the com-
plete behavior of a one-particle system is specified by its path in six-di-
mensional phase-space . A point in phase-space represents a state of a clas-
sical system . The Hamilton equations specify the system’s time-evolution 
or dynamics and thus its path in phase-space . These equations in turn re-
quire a classical Hamilton-function . The dynamics of an isolated particle, 
for instance, can be described by a classical Hamilton-function of the form 
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H = p2/2m, where p is the momentum and m the mass of the isolated par-
ticle .
For a non-interacting two-particle system we first need to specify two 
six-dimensional phase-spaces, one for each of the particles as well as a 
classical Hamilton-function of the above form for each of them . That, how-
ever, is not yet a description of a two-particle system . It is a description of 
two separate one-particle systems .
What we furthermore need is something that tells us how the descrip-
tions of the behavior of subsystems have to be combined so as to obtain the 
description of the behavior of the compound system . We basically need the 
following information: 1) The phase-space for a compound system is the 
direct sum of the phase-spaces of the subsystems . Thus, for the two-par-
ticle system we obtain a twelve-dimensional phase-space . 2) The Hamil-
ton-function for the compound system is the sum of those for the isolated 
constituents . Thus the dynamics of the system of two non-interacting par-
ticles in classical mechanics is described by a Hamilton-function of the 
form: H = p1
2/2m1 + p2
2/2m2 .
This is the third and final step of the explanation or analysis of the 
dynamics of the non-interacting two-particle system: adding up the contri-
butions of the parts according to laws of composition .
In the presence of interactions we have to introduce a further term into 
the Hamiltonian, e .g ., a term for gravitational interaction such as –Gm1m2/r, 
where G is the gravitational constant and r the distance between the two 
particles .
Let me add an example from quantum mechanics: carbon monoxide 
molecules consist of two atoms of mass m1 and m2 at a distance x . Besides 
vibrations along the x-axis, they can perform rotations in three-dimension-
al space around its centre of mass . This provides the motivation for de-
scribing the molecule as a rotating oscillator, rather than as a simple har-
monic oscillator . The compound’s (the molecule’s) behavior is explained 
in terms of the behavior of two subsystems, the oscillator and the rotator . 
These parts are not spatial parts, they are sets of degrees of freedom . The 
physicist Arno Bohm, who discusses this example in his textbook on quan-
tum mechanics, describes this procedure as follows:
We shall therefore first study the rigid-rotator model by itself . This will provide us 
with a description of the CO states that are characterised by the quantum number 
n = 0, and will also approximately describe each set of states with a given vibrational 
quantum number n . Then we shall see how these two models [The harmonic oscilla-
tor has already been discussed in a previous chapter . Author] are combined to form 
the vibrating rotator or the rotating vibrator . (Bohm 1986, p . 128)
This is a perfect illustration of a quantum-mechanical micro-explanation . 
It is in carrying out this programme that Bohm considers the following 
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subsystems: (1) a rotator, which can be described by the Schrödinger equa-
tion with the Hamiltonian: Hrot = L
2/2I, where L is the angular momen-
tum operator and I the moment of inertia . (2) an oscillator, which can be 
described by the Schrödinger equation with the following Hamiltonian: 
Hosc = P
2/2μ + μω2Q2/2, where P is the momentum operator, Q the position 
operator, ω the frequency of the oscillating entity and μ the reduced mass .
He adds up the contributions of the subsystem by invoking a law of 
composition:
IVa . Let one physical system be described by an algebra of operators, A1, in the space 
R1, and the other physical system by an algebra A2 in R2 . The direct-product space 
R1 ⊗ R2 is then the space of physical states of the physical combinations of these two 
systems, and its observables are operators in the direct-product space . The particular 
observables of the first system alone are given by A1 ⊗ I, and the observables of the 
second system alone are given by I ⊗ A2 (I = identity operator) . (Bohm 1986, p . 147)
The explanatory strategy both in the quantum and the classical case can be 
summarized as follows:
The dynamic (temporal evolution) of a compound system is micro-ex-
plainable if it is – at least in principle – possible to deduce (to explain) it 
on the basis of
(i) general laws concerning the dynamics (temporal evolution) of the 
components considered in isolation,
(ii) general laws of composition, and
(iii) general laws of interaction .
The following point is essential: laws concerning constituents considered 
in isolation are never sufficient to explain even the simplest kinds of com-
pound systems . We always need a law of composition .5
On the basis of this analysis of micro-explanation I will now examine 
whether micro-explanation provides evidence for part-whole-physical-
ism – more precisely: whether successful micro-explanation of the tem-
poral evolution of compound systems provides evidence for the claim that 
the behavior of compound systems are the way they are in virtue of the 
behavior of their parts (and some further facts about how the parts interact 
and how they are related) .
5 In this sense the behavior of wholes always transcends that of the isolated parts .
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5. Determination and the In Virtue-Relation
Let us return to Klee’s argument quoted at the outset of section 4 . He 
claimed that explanation presupposes determination .
The intuition behind this is that when we have something explained to 
us we understand it, and a large part of understanding something is know-
ing how it is determined (Klee 1984, p . 60) .
This is a claim I will concede . But much depends on how we understand 
“determined” in this context . I will concede, first that if we have an expla-
nation we have to assume that, e .g . the event that the explanans refers to 
determines the event that the explanandum refers to and, second, we know 
why this determination relation holds . I understand determination as bare 
determination, i .e . as a modal notion, such that, for instance, the values 
of x determine those of y iff for any value i of x there is some value j of y 
such that, necessarily, if x has i, y has j . The exact sense of “necessarily” 
depends on whether the determination relation holds in virtue of laws of 
nature, causation or something else . To give an example: For a (deter-
ministic) causal explanation to work we have to assume that the cause 
determines the event to be explained (assuming certain factors can be held 
fixed) and we furthermore have to assume that there is some kind of rela-
tion in nature (causation) that underlies a given explanation and makes the 
determination relation feasible .
If we make the above concession, the case of micro-explanation has 
the following implication: because we are able to explain the behavior 
(dynamics) of the compound system in terms of that of the parts, we can 
conclude that the parts determine the behavior of the compound .
Isn’t that exactly the conclusion the part-whole-physicalist was looking 
for? Doesn’t the concession imply that the behavior of compound systems 
is the way it is in virtue of the behavior of the parts?
As we will see bare determination will not be sufficient to establish 
an in virtue-relation and thus part-whole-physicalism (this relates back 
to our discussion in section 2) . For the argument from micro-explanation 
to part-whole-physicalism to be successful the relation between parts and 
wholes that has to be presupposed in micro-explanation has to qualify 
as something stronger than bare determination, it has to qualify as an in 
virtue-relation, i .e . minimally as bare determination plus the principle of 
asymmetry . So the question we have to answer is whether the relation that 
obtains between parts and wholes is indeed such that not only bare deter-
mination but also the asymmetry principle obtains .
In what follows I will argue that this is not the case . The relation be-
tween parts and wholes is mutual and thus fails to comply with the prin-
ciple of asymmetry . The relation between parts and wholes is thus no in 
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virtue-relation . The success of micro-explanation therefore fails to estab-
lish part-whole-physicalism .
I will first argue for this claim by considering non-interacting parts and 
will then take into consideration the more general case of interacting parts 
of a compound .
5 .1 . The Non-Interaction Case
In the last section I characterized micro-explanation as the explanation of 
the behavior of compound systems in terms of (a) general laws about how 
the constituents would behave in isolation and (b) general laws of compo-
sition and (c) general laws of interaction . On the basis of this analysis we 
are now in the position to pin down the exact nature of the relation between 
parts and wholes that is involved in micro-explanation . The behavior of 
the compound is determined by the behavior of the parts and the general 
laws of composition . (For the sake of simplicity I will disregard interaction 
terms in this sub-section) . Given the behavior of the parts it is the laws 
of composition that make the behavior of the compound nomologically 
necessary .
Clearly, there is a direction of explanation from the parts to the whole . 
Whenever we explain the behavior of compound systems in quantum me-
chanics on the basis of the Schrödinger equation, our starting point is the 
set of Hamiltonians for the subsystems . This is an asymmetry with re-
spect to explanation: We do not (at least not generally) explain the be-
havior of the parts in terms of the behavior of the compound . While it is 
an interesting question why there is this explanatory asymmetry, it on its 
own does not give us an ontological in virtue-relation that we need for 
part-whole-physicalism .6 But what about the underlying part-whole rela-
tion? Does it, as Klee suggested, mirror the explanatory asymmetry? Does 
it obey the asymmetry principle?
Let us take a look at the law of composition . The law of composition 
for quantum mechanics gives us a prescription for the Hamiltonian that 
describes the temporal evolution of a compound system . In the absence of 
interactions we have, strictly speaking, the following .
 Hcomp = H1 ⊗ I2 ⊗ I3 ⊗  . . . ⊗ In + I1 ⊗ H2 ⊗ I3 ⊗  . . . ⊗ In +  . . . I1 ⊗ I2 ⊗ I3 
⊗  . . . Hn
6 The explanatory asymmetry might, for instance, be due to pragmatic reasons .
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The index i ranges over all subsystems and In is the identity operator for 
the n-th subsystem’s Hilbert-space . That looks somewhat cumbersome . In-
stead we typically encounter the considerably simpler
 Hcomp = H1 + H2 +  . . . + Hn
Let us consider the case of a compound consisting of three subsystems . 
Thus we have
 Hcomp = H1 + H2 + H3
The law of composition gives rise to this formula for the Hamiltonians . It 
ensures that the behavior (dynamics) of the subsystems (represented by H1, 
H2 and H3 respectively) determines the behavior (dynamics) of the com-
pound (represented by Hcomp) .
A bare determination relation between the behavior of the parts and the 
behavior of the compound holds because we are dealing with an equation, 
and once the three Hamiltonians on the right hand side are specified, so is 
the fourth for the compound on the left hand side . But obviously the same 
is true for any of the other Hamiltonians as well . If Hcomp, H1 and H2 are 
given, H3 is determined according to the equation H3 = Hcomp – H1 – H2, and 
so forth .
Each of the four is determined as soon as the other three are fixed . The 
relation between the subsystems and the compound is mutual . Let me be 
very clear on one point: I am not claiming that the behavior of the com-
pound on its own determines the behavior of any of the parts . The claim 
is rather, that if Hcomp is given and two of the other Hamiltonians for the 
parts, the Hamiltonian for the third part is determined . The parts’ behavior 
determine the behavior of the compound and any part’s behavior is deter-
mined by the compound’s behavior plus the behavior of the other parts . 
This is what I mean by “mutual determination” and it suffices to reject the 
in virtue-claim .
The result of these considerations is: The relation that has to be pre-
supposed in order to understand the success of the micro-explanation can-
not be an in virtue relation as it is presupposed in the discussion about 
part-whole-physicalism . The reason is that both of the following claims 
come out as true:
 [w] ↞ [p3], because the compound’s behavior is partially determined 
by that of the third component or part . (The other determining fac-
tors are the fact that the law of composition obtains as well as [p1] 
and [p2] .)
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 [p3] ↞ [w], because the behavior of the third component is partially 
determined by that of the compound . (The other determining factors 
are the fact that the law of composition obtains as well as [p1] and 
[p2] .)
By appealing to laws of composition we are appealing to relations of mu-
tual determination not to in virtue-relations .
To sum up: micro-explanations in physics essentially invoke laws of 
composition . Laws of composition describe the relations that obtain be-
tween parts and wholes (they underlie the micro-explanations) . These re-
lations are relations of mutual determination . Because laws of composi-
tion describe relation of mutual determination they fail to establish the 
principle of asymmetry and thus an in virtue-relation . Therefore, appeal 
to micro-explanations provides no evidence for part-whole-physicalism .
5 .2 . The Interaction-Case
One may object that the non-interaction case is rather trivial and not very 
interesting . Taking into account interactions does indeed complicate the 
picture . But the complications have to do with the question what to con-
sider as the parts in a part-whole-explanation with interactions – rather 
than with the nature of the relation between parts and wholes . When the 
physicalist argues that micro-explanations provide evidence for the claim 
that the behavior of the compound obtains in virtue of the behavior of the 
parts, the physicalist has to specify what she means by “the behavior of the 
parts .” I will consider two specifications and argue that in both cases the 
same conclusions as in the non-interaction case hold .
Let us take a classical case with interaction . In the presence of interac-
tions we have to introduce a further term into the Hamiltonian, e .g ., a term 
for gravitational interaction such as –Gm1m2/r, where G is the gravitational 
constant and r the distance between the two particles . In such a case the 
physicalist probably has two options of describing what an explanation 
in terms of the behavior of the subsystems might mean . According to the 
first (very natural) option the relevant subsystems are the isolated particles 
in the absence of any forces acting on them . In order to explain the com-
pound’s behavior we do not only rely on the general law of composition . 
Furthermore the term for the gravitational field potential has to be added . 
This reading of ‘the behavior of the parts’ accords with the claim that the 
compound’s behavior is explained in terms of the behavior of the parts 
and their interactions . This yields the following Hamilton-function for the 
compound system:
 H1+2 = p1
2/2m1 + p2
2/2m2 – Gm1m2/r
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or
 H1+2 = H1 + H2 – Gm1m2/r
The bare determination relation holds because we are dealing with an 
equation, and once the three terms on the right hand side are specified, so 
is the fourth for the compound on the left hand side . But, as before, the 
same is true for any of the other terms as well . If H1+2, –Gm1m2/r and H2 are 
given, H1 is determined according to the equation H1 = H1+2 – H2 + Gm1m2/r .
Each of the four terms is determined as soon as the other three are 
fixed . The relation between the subsystems, the interaction and the com-
pound with respect to determination is mutual .7
We get the same conclusion as in the non-interaction case: Both of the 
following claims come out as true:
 [w] ↞ [p1], because the compound’s behavior is partially deter-
mined by that of the first component or part . (The other determining 
factors are the fact that the law of composition obtains, the fact that 
the law of gravitation obtains as well as [p2] .)
 [p1] ↞ [w], because the behavior of the first component is partially 
determined by that of the compound . (The other determining factors 
are the fact that the law of composition obtains, the fact that the law 
of gravitation obtains as well as [p2] .)
As in the non-interaction case this result is incompatible with the principle 
of asymmetry, which is constitutive for the in virtue relation as presup-
posed in the discussion about part-whole-physicalism .
The physicalist might hold that there is a different reading of “the 
behavior of the parts .” It is not the behavior of the particles considered 
on their own, but rather the particles’ actual behavior in the field that is 
generated by the other particle . (The other particle itself is not part of 
the subsystem .) Thus, the behavior of the first subsystem consists of the 
7 The claim that the determination relations that underly physical laws are mutual has al-
ready been invoked by Bertrand Russell . He famously argued that the fundamental physical 
laws provide no room for an asymmetrical casual relation . Russell observed that “the future 
‘determines’ the past in exactly the same sense in which the past ‘determines’ the future .” 
(Russell 1912/13, p . 15) . The determination relation that is described or presupposed by the 
fundamental laws of physics implies (given that the universe is closed and we are dealing 
with the physics of 1912/13) that past and future determine each other mutually and does not 
give rise to any kind of asymmetry . While Russell’s claim about the determination relation 
pertains to the temporal development of systems my analogous claim concerns the synchronic 
part-whole relation .
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first particle’s behavior in an external gravitational field generated by the 
second particle . The second subsystem is described analogously . The two 
subsystems behave according to the Hamilton equations with the following 
Hamilton functions:
 H1* = p1
2/2m1 – (Gm1m2/r) |1
 H2* = p2
2/2m2 – (Gm1m2/r) |2
‘|i’ indicates that the function (Gm1m2/r) is restricted to the phase-space of 
particle i . Let me stress that I am not committed to the claim that this can 
in general be consistently done . The physicalist who takes this option is 
confronted with a dilemma here: Either the particle’s actual behavior (i .e . 
the particle’s behavior in the external field) cannot be individuated as in-
dicated above . Then it is not clear in what sense part-whole explanations 
provide evidence for the in virtue-claim because it remains unclear what 
the parts’ behavior is . Or there is some way of individuating the parts’ be-
havior in this sense, but then it wouldn’t help the physicalist’s argument . 
What we would end up with is a Hamiltonian that has the same form as in 
the non-interaction case:
 H1+2 = H1* + H2*
So, by the same kind of argument as in the non-interaction case the deter-
mination relation would turn out to be mutual .
To conclude: Whether we consider non-interaction cases of part-whole 
explanations or interaction cases: The relations between parts and wholes 
invoked in micro-explanations turn out to be mutual . Therefore, an in vir-
tue-relation between parts on the one hand and the compounds are not pre-
supposed . Micro-explanations provide no evidence for part-whole-physi-
calism . Physics does not dictate part-whole-physicalism .
6. Objections and Replies
For the part-whole-physicalist there are various possible ways to react to 
the argument just presented . First, one might object to the argument by 
pointing out that there might be genuinely metaphysical relations that ob-
tain between parts and wholes, but are not dealt with in physics . Answer: 
While there might be such relations they are not my concern in this paper . 
My aim is merely to figure out whether part-whole-physicalism is support-
ed by what classical mechanics and quantum mechanics have to say about 
the part whole relation .
Second one might argue that the equations of physics that I relied on 
do not capture all that classical and quantum mechanics have to say about 
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the part whole relation . An analogous position is sometimes attributed to 
Nancy Cartwright with respect to causation (Field 2003, p . 443) . However, 
while there is no a priori argument against this possibility, there is no ac-
count that I know of that tells us what additional physical facts concerning 
the part whole relation there might be (that is over and above those cap-
tured in the equations of classical and quantum mechanics) . In the absence 
of such a positive account it is difficult to evaluate this objection and I will 
refrain from doing so .
Finally, and maybe most importantly, a physicalist might doubt that 
what I have presented is what anyone ever meant when they were thinking 
that the properties of the whole are determined by the properties of the 
parts in an asymmetrical way . After all, we are dealing with microscopic 
physics, and not just with two or three particles . So the objection is to 
point to further physical relations between parts and wholes that I have 
not taken account of . The objections dealt with in the following sections, 
in particular those in sections 6 .2 and 6 .3 will consider the possibility of 
further candidates for the in virtue-relation .
6 .1 . Flagpole
In the literature on explanation there is the well-known case of the height 
of a flagpole and the length of its shadow . According to the laws of ge-
ometrical optics the length of the shadow is determined by the height of the 
flagpole holding fixed certain circumstances like the position of the sun . 
At the same time, these circumstances plus the length of the shadow deter-
mines the height of the flagpole . So we have a case of mutual determina-
tion . With respect to this determination relation the principle of asymmetry 
does not hold . However, we do nevertheless believe that the fact that the 
shadow has a certain length obtains partially in virtue of the fact that the 
flagpole has a certain length but not vice versa . By analogy, even though 
the determination relation between parts and wholes might fail to obey the 
principle of asymmetry, it might still be true that the behavior of the com-
pound obtains in virtue of the behavior of the parts .
The reply is that the two cases are in a relevant way disanaloguous . 
In the case of the flagpole we can give an account of how the asymmetry 
arises, whereas we cannot do the same in the case of the relation of parts 
and wholes .
Here is one way of explaining the origin of the asymmetry in the case 
of the flagpole . Geometrical optics is a simplified model of the situation 
at hand . A more detailed description would mention the propagation of the 
light waves . In the more complete picture it is possible to explain in what 
sense the length of the shadow is the dependent variable . Gerhard Schurz 
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suggested that what’s essential in this context is the fact that a change in 
the dependent variable is brought about later:
The crucial idea […] is that the distinction between those variables which are directly 
influenced by an allowed intervention, in contrast to those which are only indirectly 
influenced by it, is possible by considering the delays of time in the process of dis-
turbing the system’s equilibrium state . (Schurz 2001, p . 61)
And with respect to our example:
Hence in every intervention allowed by C [circumstances like the position of the 
sun, Author] which disturbs the equilibrium state of the systems variables, the length 
variation of the shadow will take place slightly after the variation of the pole’s 
length – because of the finite velocity of light . (Schurz 2001, p . 61)
I will not discuss whether this suggestion does indeed give a complete 
account of the asymmetry in this example . The essential point is that this 
strategy to break the symmetry cannot be applied in the case of parts and 
wholes . What is essential for Schurz’s strategy is that we supplement the 
original description of the relation of the length of the shadow and the 
height of the flagpole by additional physical facts such as the propagation 
of the light wave . The simultaneous and mutual determination of the height 
of the flagpole and the length of its shadow is only apparent . It is a feature 
of a simplified and incomplete description of the situation only . Breaking 
the symmetry relies on a better and more detailed description .
However, the case of parts and wholes is different in this respect . There 
are no additional physical facts . For all we know the description of the 
part-whole relation given in section 4 is the most complete we have .
6 .2 . One-To-Many-Relation
However, even though our account of the part whole-relation as described 
in classical and quantum mechanics may be complete, the account may 
give room for the obtaining of asymmetries that have been overlooked so 
far . Frank Jackson, for instance, argues – in the context of levels-physical-
ism – that the asymmetry characteristic for the physicalist claim is due to 
an asymmetry of determination:
For the physicalist, the asymmetry between physical and psychological (or semantic, 
or economic, or biological, …) lies in the fact that the physical fully determines the 
psychological (or semantic, …), whereas the psychological (or semantic, …) grossly 
underdetermines the physical . (Jackson 1998, p . 15)
An analogous argument in the case of part-whole-physicalism runs as 
follows: While the behavior of the parts fully determines that of the com-
pound, the behavior of the compound grossly underdetermines that of the 
parts . In other words: The relation between the whole and the parts surely 
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seems asymmetrical insofar as to a certain behavior of the whole (dynamic 
or state) there correspond many different arrangements of the parts .
However, as I will argue, even though there is this one-to-many-rela-
tion, it does not suffice to establish an asymmetry claim . Let me illustrate 
this through a simple example . Suppose we are dealing with a massive 
compound system consisting of three subsystems . We are only interested 
in mass . Leaving out relativistic effects we know that the mass of the com-
pound (m4) adds up as follows:
(M) m1 + m2 + m3 = m4
Thus, (M) is our law of composition for our three masses . m4 characterizes 
the compound or macro-system whereas m1 to m3 characterize the con-
stituents or micro-systems . Let us assume that the compound system has 
a mass of 17 kg . This value is compatible with a plethora of values for 
m1 to m3 . 1 kg/5 kg/11 kg, 6 kg/6 kg/5 kg, 7 kg/6 kg/4 kg – all of these 
micro-states are compatible with a macro-state of 17 kg . We have a one-to-
many-relation between the compound and its constituents, which seems to 
support an asymmetry claim and therefore (maybe) the obtaining of an in 
virtue-relation (asymmetry being a necessary condition for the obtaining 
of an in virtue-relation) . However, the same kind of one-to-many-relation 
occurs if we fix a value for one of the constituents, say m1 . If m1 is fixed 
at 5 kg, that is compatible with an infinite number of values for m2 to m4: 
5 kg/5 kg/15 kg, 6 kg/6 kg/17 kg, 3 kg/7 kg/15 kg – all of them will do . 
The fact that the compound has a certain mass value is compatible with lots 
of value distributions for the subsystems . But that does not single it out as 
something special .
The laws of composition give rise to equations that allow calculating 
the behavior of the compound on the basis of the behavior of the constitu-
ents . (Calculation presupposes determination of the relevant magnitudes .) 
However, they equally allow calculating the behavior of a constituent giv-
en the relevant information about the compound and the other constitu-
ents . Whenever we have three values in (M) we can calculate the fourth 
value . In this respect there is nothing special about m4, the value for the 
macro-state . With respect to determination all of the values are on a par . 
In this sense the laws of composition (in quantum mechanics as well as in 
classical mechanics) are impartial with respect to the micro and the macro . 
It is true that the behavior of the parts fully determines that of the com-
pound and the behavior of the compound grossly underdetermines that of 
the parts . It is however also true that the behavior of the first and second 
part together with that of the compound fully determine the behavior of the 
third part, while the third part on its own grossly underdetermines that of 
the rest . If the issue of full determination by the behavior of the parts vs . 
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gross underdetermination by the behavior of the compound were sufficient 
for the obtaining of an in virtue-relation between parts and wholes both of 
the following claims would come out as true:
 [w] ← [p1], [p2], [p3], Δ
because the compound’s behavior is fully determined by that of the third 
parts (Plus some compositional facts) .
 [p3] ← [w], [p1], [p2], Δ
because the behavior of the third part is fully determined by that of the 
compound, the first two parts (Plus some compositional facts) .
As a consequence the following two claims about partial grounding/
partial obtaining in virtue of would hold:
 [w] ↞ [p3],
 [p3] ↞ [w] .
Again, this result, is incompatible with the principle of asymmetry which 
is constitutive for the in virtue relation as presupposed in the discussion 
about part-whole-physicalism .
6 .3 . Coarse Concepts
When it comes to the thermodynamics of, say, ideal gases, we not only 
encounter the one-to-many-relation as discussed in the previous section . 
There seems to be a further candidate for an asymmetrical relation .
The macro-description in terms of pressure (p), volume (V) and temper-
ature (T) plus the exact specification of N – 1 particles doesn’t determine 
the state of the ‘last’ particle (the N-th particle) . There are various possible 
states that are compatible with the given constraints . On the other hand, 
the specification of all particles does determine the values for p, V and T . 
Is that an asymmetrical relation of the relevant kind?
For example, if temperature is mean kinetic energy, the velocities and 
positions of N – 1 particles and the temperature of the gas don’t determine 
the velocities and position of the Nth particle . There is a whole set of ve-
locities of the Nth particle compatible with a certain temperature of the gas 
plus the velocities and positions of the N – 1 particles .
Rejoinder:
For a start I will leave out the thermodynamic description of the ide-
al gas and focus on the mechanical description . Let’s assume we have a 
complete description of the compound system (the gas) . The state of the 
compound can be represented as a point in 6N-dim phase-space . Given the 
state of the compound as well as the states of N – 2 parts, the state of the 
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second but last particle is not yet completely determined, because it can 
get into either the N – 1-slot or the N-slot . However, given the state of the 
compound and the states of N – 1 particles, the state of the N-th particle is 
determined . Of course the particles’ states also determine the state of the 
compound . In this sense we have mutual determination of parts and wholes 
on the level of a purely mechanical characterization .
When we describe the ideal gas in terms of thermodynamic proper-
ties such as temperature and pressure, we use a coarser description of the 
compound system . It is coarse in the sense that a lot of micro-states are 
compatible with given values for p, V and T . Because we use this coarse 
terminology, i .e . p, V, T for the compound system, the states of N – 1 
particles plus the state of the compound fail to determine the state of the 
Nth particle . Strictly speaking, this is a case where the variables represent-
ing the behavior of the compound system are determined by the variables 
representing the behavior of the parts, whereas it does not hold that the 
variables representing the behavior of N – 1 parts plus the variable(s) rep-
resenting the behavior of the compound determine the variable for the N-th 
particle’s behavior .
However, I think we have good reasons not to take this asymmetry at 
face value, i .e . not to read it realistically as telling us something about the 
underlying the ontology . The reason is that the asymmetry is generated 
by our choice of coarse-grained variables for the compound system . The 
asymmetry disappears if we choose the more precise mechanical descrip-
tion . Furthermore, asymmetries that are due to coarse-grained variables 
can be generated at will . This can be illustrated by the following example: 
Let’s define an object as heavy if it weighs, say 150, 151, … or 200 kg . If 
the object has N parts then the masses of the N parts determine whether or 
not the object is heavy . But the object being heavy plus the masses of N – 1 
parts do not determine the mass of the N-th part . The parts determine the 
whole, but the whole plus N – 1 parts do not determine the remaining part .
However, the same kind of coarse concept can be defined for one of the 
parts . Take part no . 7 . Part no . 7 is quite heavy if it weighs 50 or 51 or 52 
or 53 kg . If the compound that no . 7 is a part of has N parts, then the mass 
of the compound plus all the masses of the other parts determine whether 
or not no . 7 is quite heavy . However, the mass of the compound is not 
determined by no . 7 being quite heavy plus the masses of the other parts 
(because of the coarseness of ‘quite heavy’) .
What this shows is that we can generate asymmetries at will wherever 
we introduce coarse-grained variables . Therefore we should not read these 
asymmetries realistically . They are entirely due to the choice of coarse 
rather than precise variables and do not seem to have any implication with 
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respect to the question what kind of ontological relations obtains between 
parts and wholes .
7. Conclusion
To sum up: Part-whole-physicalism is not supported by what classical me-
chanics and quantum mechanics have to say about the part whole relation . 
Not even those cases in classical and quantum mechanics, which are most 
favorable to the part whole physicalist (in the sense of prima facie sup-
port) – namely cases of micro-explanation of the dynamics of compound 
systems – provide evidence for the thesis that the behavior of the com-
pound obtains in virtue of the behavior of the parts (and some further facts 
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